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Abstract
We study the locally-defined social capital metric of Palasek (2013) for determining
individuals’ prestige within an online social network. From it we derive an equivalent
global measure by considering random walks over the network itself. This result inspires
a novel expression quantifying the strategic desirability of a potential social connection.
We show in silico that ideal social neighbors tend to satisfy a “big fish in a small pond”
criterion and that the distribution of neighbor-desirability throughout a network is
governed by anti-homophily.
I. Introduction
Economic analysis of digital commodities is often made difficult by the absence of any
marginal cost to the distributor [1]. Although some goods maintain their propriety, many
others–open-source software being a widely-studied example–are distributed online at no
direct cost to the consumer. There are competing theories to explain the latter seemingly-
uneconomic behavior including, for instance, an expectation of reciprocity [2] and reputation-
seeking by the producers [3, p. 53]. In either case, in order to begin to study the producer’s
decision-making process, we must construct a theory of utility which justifies potentially
significant fixed costs, the details of which will likely depend on the peculiarities of the
market at hand.
In this work we will focus our attention on the exchange of social gratification in online
communities. This situation evidently falls into the category described above in which a
commodity is exchanged but at no marginal cost to the supplier. The literature has indeed
identified the acquisition of social capital as a central motivation for social media use [4].
We will proceed using the utility function introduced in [5], to be recalled in the next
section. This formulation offers a local method of measuring the centrality of a member of
a social network based on the rate at which he or she receives “likes,” calculated relative
to the centralities of the individual’s social neighbors. In the author’s previous work, the
equilibrium effects of prestige-seeking across the social network were considered. Here
we will work with the mathematical formalism itself to gain deeper insight into how it
is calculated (for its definition is recursive) and to identify related metrics which may be
sociologically relevant.
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II. Defining a “like”-based centrality measure
We will consider an online social network over an undirected graph G of order N . Agents
may bestow “likes” upon each other with a non-negative rate. Labeling G’s vertices from 1
to N , we let R be the N ×N matrix in which the entry Ri,j represents the rate at which j
“likes” i. We require that no transactions occur between a pair for which there is no edge
in G; ie. if (i, j) /∈ G then Ri,j = 0.
Next we will define a centrality measure similar in concept to the random walk be-
tweenness centrality of Newman [6].
Definition 1. Let G be a connected undirected graph of order N with nodes of degree
δ1, δ2, . . . , δN . Define a matrix
P = diag(δ−11 , δ
−1
2 , . . . , δ
−1
N )G (1)
where diag(·) is the diagonal matrix with the given entries and G here is the adjacency
matrix of the graph G. We will denote as p the normalized eigenvector of P corresponding
to the eigenvalue of maximum magnitude as given by the Perron-Frobenius theorem.
It is easy to verify that P is a stochastic matrix. Repeated multiplication by it therefore
models the Markov chain of a memoryless random walk over the graph G. The eigenvector
p, the steady-state probability distribution over the vertices of G, will become of use to
us later. We will now define another centrality measure, this time using the matrix R as
well. We proceed in analogy to the well-known eigenvector centrality, but now scaling by
the centralities of the neighboring nodes. Such an adjustment simulates the effect of an
individual’s centrality appearing greater or lesser when compared to those with whom he
interacts.
Definition 2 (likedness centrality from [5]). Let G be an undirected graph of order N and
R a real N × N matrix with the criteria above. Furthermore, let a likedness centrality
vector L be any vector of positive components satisfying the recursive relation
N∑
j=1
(Gi,jLi −Ri,j)Lj = 0 (2)
where Gi,j is the (i, j) entry of G’s adjacency matrix.
We will often identify the coordinates of this vector with the respective vertices of G.
Note that (2) is unaffected up to a scaling of L and R so this definition cannot be unique.
We remedy this as follows.
Definition 3 (unique likedness centrality). Define the unique likedness centrality to be the
vector L∗ satisfying both (2) and
p · L∗ = 1 (3)
where p is as in Definition 1.
If G is connected as specified in Definition 1, then the components of p are nonzero
and uniqueness can be achieved simply by normalization.
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III. A random walk interpretation of L∗
It will greatly simplify our notation henceforth to define for a non-isolated node i
σi =
N∑
j=1
Gi,jLj . (4)
Thus we can rearrange (2) to obtain
Li =
1
σi
N∑
j=1
Ri,jLj , (5)
recalling that Definition 2 disallows Lj , and therefore σi, to be zero. Iteratively applying
this formula n times yields
Li0 =
N∑
i1=1
N∑
i2=1
· · ·
N∑
in=1
Lin n−1∏
j=0
σ−1ij Rij ,ij+1
 . (6)
The product is only nonzero when all of the Rij ,ij+1 are positive, which we specified occurs
only when all of the edges (ij , ij+1) are included in G. Therefore it is sufficient to sum over
all paths on G of length n beginning at i0. That is,
Li0 = (number of n-paths on G from i0)×
〈
Lin
n−1∏
j=0
σ−1ij Rij ,ij+1
〉
(7)
where 〈 · 〉 is the mean over all n-paths on G of the form (i0, i1, . . . , in). For now we will
refer to the number of n-paths from i0 as pi
n
i0
. To work with the second factor, we will
consider what happens when n becomes large. We begin by rearranging the product into
the form
Li0 = limn→∞pi
n
i0
〈
Lin
N∏
i=1
σ−#ii ∏
j:(i,j)∈G
R
#(i,j)
i,j
〉 (8)
where #i and #(i, j) are respectively the number of times the vertex i and the edge (i, j)
appear in the path. We call upon the law of large numbers to reinterpret the expectation
operator as a mean over many random paths beginning at i0. The product over i weighs
all steps of the walk equally so for n  1, the choice of in and therefore the value of
Lin approaches independence from the product. This independence permits us to invoke
multiplicativity of the expectation operator. We defined the transition matrix for a Markov
walk over a graph in Definition 1 whence we can evaluate 〈Lin〉 exactly.
Li0 = limn→∞pi
n
i0
(
N∑
i=1
(i0
>Pn)iLi
)〈
N∏
i=1
σ−#ii ∏
j:(i,j)∈G
R
#(i,j)
i,j
〉 (9)
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Furthermore, the distribution of vertices follows the probability distribution resulting from
the Markov random walk on G for which P is the transition matrix. Therefore, noting that
the frequency of an edge is the frequency divided by the degree of the starting vertex, we
have
Li0 = limn→∞pi
n
i0(P
ni0) · L
N∏
i=1
σ−(i0>∑n−1t=0 P t)ii ∏
j:(i,j)∈G
R
(i0>
∑n−1
t=0 P
t)
i
/δi
i,j
 . (10)
Observe that we can also express the number of n-paths in terms of a sum of powers of
P . In particular, the location at each step is a probability distribution over the graph’s
nodes derived from the same Markov process as before. The graph’s degree distribution
then gives the number of possible transitions from each vertex. Thus,
pini0 =
n−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
δ
(i0>P t)i
i =
N∏
i=1
δ
(i0>
∑n−1
t=1 P
t)
i
i (11)
which we can rearrange to fit into our expression for Li0 .
Li0 = (p · L) limn→∞
N∏
i=1
(σi
δi
)−1
·
 ∏
j:(i,j)∈G
Ri,j
1/δi

(
∑n
t=0 P
t)
i0,i
(12)
This result is far more intuitive than it may appear, although the manner in which it is
arranged may hint at some simplifications. The scaling factor is that which we required
to define the unique likedness centrality. Furthermore, recalling the definition of σi, we
can interpret the first term in the product, σi/δi, to be the mean likedness of the nodes
connected to i. Finally, the second term in the product is simply the geometric mean of
the rates at which i is “liked” by its connections. Thus we have, adjusting the indexing,
L∗i = limn→∞
∏
j∈V (G)
(
GM of rates at which j is “liked”
AM of j’s connections’ likednesses
)(∑nt=0 P t)i,j
, (13)
recalling our earlier assumptions which provide that p · L 6= 0. The astute reader might
notice that because P is stochastic, the Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees that it has
an eigenvalue of 1 and its geometric series does not therefore converge. Although this
is true, some experimentation reveals that despite the exponents’ being unbounded, the
bases’ distribution both above and below unity leads to convergence of the product itself.
IV. Measuring neighbors’ desirability
The result of the previous section provides a qualitatively different interpretation as to
how likedness centrality is calculated. We originally defined it as a local measure of the
prominence of a node relative to his immediate neighbors. Instead, we now define a score
for every vertex in the network based on its local prominence and incorporate each, scaled
4
S. Palasek
by its closeness to i, into the computation L∗i . This score is in a convenient form in (13)
as it appears independently of both the length of the walk and the agent whose centrality
is being calculated. It is therefore sensible to study it as a property of a node in its own
right.
Definition 4 (neighbor desirability). Define the neighbor desirability of a non-isolated
vertex i to be the ratio of the geometric mean of the rates at which i receives “likes” to the
arithmetic mean of the likedness centralities of those with whom i is connected.
The equations derived in the last section illustrate that this ratio quantifies the desir-
ability of being near i in the network. Neighbor desirability resembles likedness centrality in
all ways but the fact that the former metric decreases strictly with respect to the likedness
centrality of the neighboring nodes, whereas the effect is non-strict for the latter. More
explicitly, it is most desirable to be near those who, though highly “liked,” are among
those with little prestige themselves. This “big fish in a small pond” observation is pro-
vided robustly by (13) despite the complexity resulting from heavy interdependence of the
centralities throughout a community. The emergence of a geometric, not arithmetic, mean
of rates may come as a surprise. This is not merely a formal distinction; the geometric
mean uses a far more egalitarian weighing of the samples. That is, even if a node i “likes”
at a far greater rate than another j does, perturbing either rate by a fixed proportion of
its starting value has an equivalent effect on the result of the mean.
In order to examine the structural factors of a network that may affect a vertex’s
neighbor desirability, we conduct a computer experiment as follows. We randomly select
a graph G of order 100 according to the Barabasi-Albert random graph distribution, the
result of which is shown in Figure 1. This model is known to produce networks with realistic
characteristics including preferential attachment (yielding a scale-free degree distribution)
and low average path length [7]. For this fixed graph we randomly generate 10,000 “like”
rate ensembles and compute the likedness centrality vector in each case, effectively yielding
1,000,000 distinctly operating individuals to study. The rates of “liking” are assumed to
follow an exponential distribution with λ = 1/2.
It should be noted that although (13) appears straightforward, the denominator in the
product depends on a number of structural features of the graph as demonstrated in [5].
We therefore examine the effect of various centrality measures on the neighbor desirability.
Because all the standard metrics prove to exhibit a qualitatively similar trend, only those
with the least noise are shown in Figure 2. Consistent with the latter part of our prior
“big fish in a small pond” criterion for neighbor desirability, well-connected nodes suffer a
clear deficiency in desirability, with depletion most nearly resembling a power law.
To investigate the “big fish” effect we might also study the relationship between an
agent’s likedness centrality and neighbor desirability. This may seem like a trivial consid-
eration given that desirability is proportional to the mean of the incoming rates, but that
is to neglect the reciprocal nature of likedness centrality. Nonetheless, a strong positive
correlation between the two measures of centrality is found and depicted in Figure 3.
Finally, we wish to determine whether connected pairs of nodes are more or less likely
to have like neighbor desirabilities. The first panel in Figure 4 illustrates that the most
desirable neighbors are themselves proximate to worse neighbors on average. This trend
becomes even more pronounced when we take into account the sampling bias introduced by
5
S. Palasek
Figure 1: The sample graph G, generated with the Barabasi-Albert model with parameters m0 = 5 and
t = 95 (employing the authors’ notation). Communities are identified according to a modularity-based
clustering metric.
Figure 2: Neighbor desirability’s dependence on some traditional centrality measures, computed over 10,000
samples of communities populating the graph G. Robust negative trends are identified on the log-log scale.
In particular, the relationship between a node’s neighbor desirability and betweenness centrality is closely
given by ND = 0.708× BC−0.034 (R2 > 0.999).
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Figure 3: Neighbor desirability’s dependence on mean likedness centrality. The log-log scale reveals an
asymptotic power law trend, inflicted by some heteroscedasticity due to the tail of the population-wide dis-
tribution of likedness centrality. The precise relationship is given by NC = 0.204× LC0.844 (R2 > 0.99).
the underlying distribution of neighbor desirability, shown in the second panel of the same
figure. This observation and the prior regarding centrality measures become apparent in
Figure 5 which shows G with its vertices and edges colored according to their neighbor
desirability and mean neighbor desirability, respectively.
V. Conclusion
Our first key finding is (13), an equivalent formulation of Definition 2. This result is
remarkable in that it begins with likedness centrality in a quasi-eigenvector centrality form,
which only directly depends on a node’s neighbors, and produces a global metric, which
considers a characteristic of every vertex in the graph and scales them according to their
proximities to the vertex at hand. This characteristic is found to be useful in and of itself as
a measure of a node’s effect on the social prestiges of others. We were able to identify several
robust properties of this so-called “neighbor desirability.” First, distinct from likedness
centrality, it correlates negatively with traditional structural centrality metrics (Figure 2).
Then, as would be expected, we saw that desirable neighbors have more social capital on
average (Figure 3). Finally, desirable nodes tend to have connections with less desirable
nodes on average (Figure 4). These three factors combine to what we call the “big fish in
a small pond” criterion according to which the most desirable neighbors tend to be very
prominent but within less-esteemed circles.
We conclude with a remark on the limitations of this study’s methods. Throughout the
in silico experiments of Section IV, we assumed that the entries of R are independent and
identically-distributed, neglecting any strategic behavior by the agents. Therefore, we may
only consider this to be a study of the neighbor desirability metric itself and not of features
7
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Figure 4: The effect of neighbor desirability on the mean desirability of one’s connections. The two
log-plots respectively show this correlation in absolute terms and scaled to show how over-represented a
neighbor desirability is with respect to the global distribution. The unweighted version is plotted along with
the exponential fit 〈ND〉 = 0.674× exp(−0.148ND) (R2 > 0.999).
Figure 5: The graph G is again plotted, now with vertices colored by their neighbor desirability (in-
creasing from blue to red). The previously-observed effects including inverse correlation with centrality
and anti-homophily are apparent. A neutral node (of unitary neighbor desirability) appears as yellow
(RGB ≈ (1, 1, .4)).
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of realistic communities which respond to it and its derivatives. Strategic optimization of
likedness centrality in particular has been investigated in [5], which shows that societies of
prestige-seeking agents can produce some emergent network features. A similar analysis
must be done for neighbor desirability, though the problem of finding equilibrium rate
matrices is made difficult by the large number of variables and nonlinearity of likedness
centrality.
References
[1] Bakos, Yannis. (1998). The emerging role of electronic marketplaces on the Internet.
Communications of the ACM, 41 (8), 35-42.
[2] Veale, K. (2003). Internet gift economies: Voluntary payment schemes as tangible reci-
procity. First Monday, 8 (12).
[3] Raymond, E. S. (2001). The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary. O’Reilly Media, Inc.
[4] Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2007). The Benefits of Facebook “Friends:”
Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites. Journal of
Computer-Mediated Communication, 12 (4), 1143-1168.
[5] Palasek, S. (2013). On the Strategic Allocation of Social Gratification. arXiv:1309.2052.
[6] Newman, M. E. (2004). A measure of betweenness centrality based on random walks.
Social Networks, 27 (1), 39-54.
[7] Baraba´si, A. & Albert, R. (1999). Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. Science,
286 (5439), 509-512.
9
